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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIoN-WHENq RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTY
BENEFICIARY ARE VOID AS TESTAMENTARY IN CHARACTER BECAUSE DEPENDENT
UPON DEATH or PROMISSOR AS A CONDmo.-In the recent case of McCarthy
v. Pieret1 the decedent mortgagee, when executing an extension agree
ment, included a provision that, in the event of her death before maturity,
the remaining interest and the principal at maturity were to be paid to
certain relatives. The plaintiffs, as third party beneficiaries of this clause,
after the mortgagee's death demanded payment of the interest from the
mortgagor. Upon proof of the contract, the lower court gave summary
judgment for the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals of New York, however,
held the instrument to be an attempt to make a testamentary disposition
and, bcause not executed with the formality required by the Statute of
Wills, to be void. The court pointed out that it was evident from the contract that the mortgagee intended to retain full control up to the time of
her death and that therefore no interest vested in plaintiff until the death
of the mortgagee. The court based its reasoning upon the fact that the
mortgagee could have accepted payment and discharged the mortgagor
124 N.E. (2d) 102 (N. Y. 1940).
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or, if necessary, started foreclosure proceedings without joining the beneficiary, because, by the express wording of the contract, the rights of third
party beneficiaries were not to come into existence until the happening
of a condition, the death of the mortgagee.2
The instrument in the instant case does not purport to be a deed but
only an executory contract. Most of the cases of contracts performable
at death have involved a performance running to the promisee who furnishes the consideration, and they have been held enforceable.3 Sometimes the performance is intended to run to a third party beneficiary.
Among these cases are life insurance contracts, stock purchase contracts,
and revocable trusts. In the former, no question is now raised of such
contracts violating the Statute of Wills. Their validity is conceded even as
to contingent beneficiaries. The nontestamentary classification of such
contracts is explained on the ground that no property of the insured
passes to the beneficiary, because, prior to death the insured can reach
only the cash value, while the face amount of the policy is paid at his
death. 4 Although the claim of the beneficiary can be destroyed by the
insured, the tenuous distinction between the beneficiary's and the insured's
interest has apparently been accepted as removing such contracts from
the prohibited class. And the same explanation seems to have been accepted in the stock purchase contracts. 5 Living trust agreements, although revocable, are also given effect despite the fact that the beneficiary
is to receive the benefits at the death of the settlor.6 The fact that posses2 The court said, "Had the mortgagor desired to pay the mortgage he could
former, it does not legally appear that the receiver was not entitled to enforce
tives would have had no interest . . . Suppose there had been default . . . and
foreclosure was necessary. Could the mortgagee have foreclosed or would it have
been necessary to join these collateral relatives? To put the question is to answer
it. These collaterals had no present interest . . . This to my mind is an attempt
to provide for the passing of property at death, in the nature of a will ....
"
8 In re Beyschlags Estate, 201 Wis. 613, 231 N.W. 165 (1930). See also In re
McIntosh's estate, 182 Iowa 23, 159 N.W. 223 (1916); Fiscus v. Wilson, 74 Neb. 444,
104 N.W. 856 (1905).
4 Sigal v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 A. 742 (1935)
states: "The ordinary life insurance policy somewhat resembles a will . . . but is
not a will because it does not operate upon any property of the insured owned
by him at death." See also Reed v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society,
190 N. Y. 111, at 118, 82 N.E. 734 (1937), holding that a life insurance policy is a
contract to pay a sum of money upon the death of the insured, in consideration
of payment or payments duly made during life.
5 In re Koss Estate, 106 N. J. -Eq. 323, 150 A. 360 (1930), reversing 105 N. J. Eq.
29, 146 A. 471 (1929): "It is obvious from a reading of the contract in question,
that there is no specific property to which Gertrude Koss, in her lifetime was
ever entitled. Had she remained a participant in the plan until its termination she
would have received a certain number of shares of stock, the exact number of
which could not be determined. Had she cared to withdraw, she would have been
obliged to take only the money contributed and interest. She would lose, not only
the contribution, made by the company . . . but all the benefits which would have
accrued by reason of management."
6 Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45, 10 N.E. 257 (1887); Bear v. Millikin Trust
Co., 336 IIl. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
sion of the property has been transferred to the trustee in the settlor's
lifetime substantiates the writing and eliminates the possibility of fraud
or forgery. The same can be said of the money which is given by the
creditor to the debtor to be paid, pursuant to written agreement, to the
creditor if alive or to the beneficiary if he is not, if it is conceded that
the contract is no more ambulatory than the revocable trust.
In the instant case the court expressed the opposite opinion-that the
mortgagee died prior to the maturity of the debt is identical with that
which would go to the mortgagee if she were alive at maturity. Therefore, it is said, this case is not like an insurance contract, and since the
beneficiary's interest is conditional on the mortgagee's death before
maturity, the beneficiary's interest is not vested in the lifetime of the
mortgagee; thus the interest can be passed by will only. This rationale
is supposed to dispose of the whole matter. The only comparable cases
found have been decided the same way. 7 But it is well known that the
New York courts have not been too kindly disposed toward pure donee
beneficiaries and at least one case in Rhode Island8 is unfavorable to
them. The Rhode Island court in the case most comparable to the instant
case seems to treat the contract as attempting to give the beneficiary
an unexecuted gift. 9
In many jurisdictions the rights of the beneficiary are deemed to arise
by force of the contract itself and not because of an executed gift. In
such states it would probably be said that the promisee could not, with10
out the beneficiary's consent, release the promisor from his promise.
In the instant case the court expressed the opposite opinion-that the
mortgagee could release the mortgagor without the beneficiary's consent.
Whether the intsrument at hand, therefore, is testamentary or not might
well be said to depend upon the attitude of the court respecting the rights
of a donee beneficiary.11 It is submitted that, while the decision is consistent with New York law on third party beneficiaries, it should not be
followed in those states where a third party beneficiary acquires an irrevocable interest in the contract when it is made.
C. G. Doym
7 Sliney v. Cormier, 49 R. I. 74, 139 A. 665 (1928); Priester v. Hohloch, 75 N.Y.S.
405 (1902).
8 Wilbur v. Wilbur, 17 R. I. 295, 21 A. 497 (1891).
9 Sliney v. Cormier, 49 R. I. 74, 139 A. 665 (1928). Decedent loaned money to a
third party and provided in the instrument that in the event of her death before
maturity the principal was to be paid to her husband, and in the event of his
death before maturity, the principal was to be paid to plaintiff, a niece. It was
held that all control was in decedent until death; therefore no present interest
passed at the time of the contract, and since it was an attempt to make a testamentary disposition of property without compliance with the Statute of Wills, it
was void.
10 Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N.W. 440, 61 L.R.A. 509, 96 Am. St.
Rep. 1003 (1903); Bay v. Williams, 112 IM. 91, 1 N.E. 340 (1884).
11 See William H. Page, "The Power of the Contracting Parties to Alter a Contract for Rendering Performance to a Third Person," 12 Wis. L. Rev. 141 (1937).
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COURTS - INJUNCTION - JuRISDICTION OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHIcAGo
UNDER UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT TO IssuE RESTRAINING ORDRs.-An in-

teresting problem arising out of Sections 13 and 14 of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act' was recently presented to the Illinois Appellate Court for
the first time. In the case of Trade Bond and Mortgage Company v.
Schwartz,2 the question arose as to the power of the Municipal Court of
Chicago to exercise jurisdiction under Sections 13 and 14 to grant the
necessary relief therein provided. In that case the plaintiff, after judgment, obtained a writ of injunction or restraining order from the Municipal Court restraining the defendants, owners of the stock certificate,
from divesting themselves of ownership. A bailiff's sale followed at which
plaintiff purchased the stock. It was admitted that a court of general
equitable jurisdiction had the power to grant the restraining injunction
under Section 13, but it was contended that the Municipal Court of Chicago
was not qualified to grant such an injunction. The Illinois Appellate Court
held that it was.
At common law shares of stock in a corporation were held not to be
subject to execution.3 The basis for this holding rested in the fact that
shares of stock were chosen in action and of such an intangible nature
that there could be no change of possession by a mere attachment of the
stock certifiate. Under Sections 13 and 14 of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Acts this has been changed so that a creditor may levy under certain
conditions as set out therein and to that end may have necessary assistance from court of appropriatejurisdiction. Being statutory and in derogation of the common law, these sections should be strictly construed;
and this immediately presents the question whether the Municipal Court
of Chicago is such a court and should possess authority to grant injunctive
relief.
It is well settled that the Municipal Court of Chicago does not have
general equity powers 4 and hence if "appropriate" as used in the statute
1 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 32, §§ 428, 429. Section 13 of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act provides, "No attachment or levy upon shares of stock for which a certificate
is outstanding shall be valid until such certificate be actually seized by the officer
making the attachment or levy, or be surrendered to the corporation which issued
it or its transfer by the holder be enjoined. Except where a certificate is lost or
destroyed, such corporation shall not be compelled to issue a new certificate for
the stock until the old certificate is surrendered to it." Section 14 [of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act] provides, "A creditor whose debtor is the owner of a certificate shall be entitled to such aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction, by injunction or otherwise, in attaching such certificate or in satisfying the claim by
means thereof as is allowed in law or in equity, in regard to property which cannot readily be attached or levied upon by ordinary legal process."
2 303 IMI. App. 165, 24 N.E. (2d) 892 (1940).
s Alexander v. Live Stock National Bank, 282 IM. App. 315 (1935). See also
note, 1 A.L.R. 653.
4 i. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 37, §§ 356-372; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, §§ 125-218.
See also Barry v. Knight, 296 IMI. App. 277, 15 N.E. (2d) 999 (1938); People ex rel.
Dr. Pierre Chemical Co. v. Municipal Court, 297 Ill. App. 431, 17 N.E. (2d) 999
(1938).
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means courts of "equitable" jurisdiction the court in question is clearly
without authority to act as it did. Should Sections 13 and 14 apply to
courts of general equity jurisdiction only? If the legislature had meant
to restrict these sections to courts of general equity jurisdiction, it might
easily have specifically designated such courts instead of using the term
"courts of appropriate jurisdiction." This is especially true in view of
the fact that the former remedy available to a creditor who wished to
reach a share of stock belonging to his judgment debtor, was a creditor's
bill in equity. Undoubtedly, this remedy is still available to him and in
such proceedings he could certainly use the peculiarly equitable writ of
injunction to enforce his rights. Had the legislature confined the type of
aid available under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act to injunctive process,
then, until authority to grant injunctions is vested in other courts, the
designation of the type of aid as "injunctive" would have clearly limited
the term "appropriate courts" to mean equity courts. The statute would
then have done no more than codify existing practice. However the legislature made the problem still more ambiguous by adding that the relief
may be injunctive and "otherwise." If the Municipal Court of Chicago
can grant relief "otherwise" than by injunction, then it can be one of
the courts of appropriate jurisdiction referred to in the statute.
The Municipal Court of Chicago is purely a statutory court and can
act only within the statutory provisions. 5 Being a court of record, it has
every court's power to render judgment and issue process;6 and with
this power the necessary adjunct-the power to make orders necessary to
give effect to those judgments and make them binding and operative. 7
The statute also vests the Municipal Court with power to conduct supplemental proceedings designed to enable creditors to reach at least the
personal property8 of judgment debtors and to that end to enter restraining orders. 9 Such an order, like the one in the instant case, might well
be the other type of relief meant by the legislature in the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act. The Appellate Court has so construed it and has thus expanded the power and scope of the Municipal Court of Chicago. Apparently only one other court has done likewise among the 28 states which
have adopted this statute since 1910.10 The New Jersey Supreme Court in
5 Lakeside Fish & Oyster Co. v. Mutual Fish Co., 155 Ill. App. 681 (1910).
6 In re Rex Petition, 166 Ill. App. 607 (1912).
7 7 R. C. L. § 63, p. 1034; 15 C. J. § 108, pp. 811, 812; Phelps v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Ass'n, 112 F. 453, 61 L.R.A. 717 (1901).
8 People v. Cohen, 163 Ill. App. 115 (1911).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 37, § 424.
10 The Uniform Stock Transfer Act was adopted in Illinois in 1917. By January,
1940, 28 states and Alaska had adopted it. The following are the states of adoption:
Alabama, 1931; Arkansas, 1923; California, 1931; Colorado, 1927; Connecticut,
1917; Georgia, 1939; Idaho, 1927; Illinois, 1917; Indiana, 1923; Louisiana, 1910;
Maryland, 1910; Massachusetts, 1910; Michigan, 1913; Minnesota, 1933; New
Hampshire, 1937; New Jersey, 1916; New York, 1913; Ohio, 1911; Oregon, 1935;
Pennsylvania, 1911; Rhode Island, 1912; South Dakota, 1921; Tennessee, 1925;
Utah, 1927; Virginia, 1924; Washington, 1939; West Virginia, 1931; Wisconsin,
1913; Alaska, 1914.
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Progressive Building and Loan Ass'n v. Rudolph,1 a case construing
Section 13, recognized an injunction by a court of law, issuing under that
section. These two decisions if followed and sustained, may provide new
remedies for creditors whose debtors own certificates of stock in corporations.
G. R. KEEN
DEEDs-CoNsTRucTIoN AND OPERATION OF RESERVATIoN-WHETHER GRANroR

MY RESERvE LIFE ESTATE TO SPOUSE.-Saunders v. Saunders,' involved a
deed made by Lillian F. Saunders quitclaiming her fee in a farm to her
two sons. Her husband joined in the deed, which was in ordinary form,
waiving homestead and dower. It provided, "The aforesaid grantors hereby expressly reserve unto themselves the use of the above conveyed
premises for and during the time of their natural lives." Lillian F.
Saunders died on February 1, 1927, and a judgment creditor of her husband sought to levy an execution on his life estate in the farm. The sons
filed suit to quiet title, contending that the deed could not operate to vest
a life estate in their father upon the death of their mother and consequently
he had no interest in the property. The Appellate Court held that the deed
vested no life estate in the surviving husband and that on the2 death of
Lillian F. Saunders all her husband's rights were extinguished.
On appeal the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Gunn said, "It is
a general rule that in a deed of conveyance a reservation by the owner
is effective only in favor of the grantor, upon the theory that it holds back
some interest from the estate conveyed and that, ordinarily, such a
reservation cannot vest an interest in a third party unless words of grant
are used." This is the basic general rule and is universally adhered to.
However, the majority of states have allowed an exception to the general
rule to operate in favor of a reservation of a life estate to a surviving
spouse.
The statements referred to above voiced the inclination of the Supreme
Court to follow the majority rule and allow such an exception in favor
of husband and wife. 4 However, the Appellate Court, dismissing these
statements as mere dicta, decided along with the minority of states and
held that there was no difference between a reservation to a stranger and
one to a surviving spouse. 5
11 113 N. J. L. 204, 172 A. 884 (1934).
1 373 IMI. 302, 26 N.E. (2d) 126 (1940).

2 300 IM1.App. 368, 21 N.E. (2d) 34 (1939). The opinion of the court is discussed
in note, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW 378, and criticized in 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 559.
3 See Legout v. Price, 318 Il1. 425, 149 N.E. 427 (1925); Johnson v. Bantock, 38
IMI.111 (1865); DuBois v. Judy, 291 IIl. 340, 126 N.E. 104 (1920).
4 Douglas v. West, 140 IlM.455, 463, 31 N.E. 403 (1892); White v. Willard, 232 nl.
464, 83 N.E. 954 (1908); Bullard v. Suedmeier, 291 IMl. 400, 126 N.E. 117 (1920);
340, 126 N.E. 104 (1920).
DuBois v. Judy, 291 111.

5Lemon v. Lemon, 273 Mo. 484, 201 S.W. 103 (1918).
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After reviewing the authorities at length, 6 the Supreme Court concluded that there is a sound basis for holding that a distinction exists
between a reservation in a deed in favor of a grantor and his wife and
one in which the grantor reserves an interest to a third person not presently interested in the property granted or conveyed. This is put upon the
ground that a spouse

"

. . .

has such a present interest in the property

by way of homestead, or such an indefeasible interest as heir or by way
of dower that the combined interest of husband and wife in the property
might be deemed sufficient to support the reservations of a life estate
to either or both of them, by their joint execution of a deed which conveyed or waived all of their rights,"' 7 without the express words of grant
from the one holding the legal title, hitherto considered necessary.
This is apparently an attempt to place this situation within the rule
that a reservation to be valid had to operate in favor of the person from
whom title passed, upholding this reservation by interpreting the rule to
require simply that the reservation be to one of the grantors, and not a
stranger to the deed. 8 Whether or not such reasoning is logical in view
of the fact that the non-owning spouse reserves an estate which is greater
than the rights of homestead and dower need not be considered, for the
justice and good sense of the exception seems clear. The non-owning
spouse can enter into the conveyance, trading his rights of homestead
and dower for the security of a present life estate. Moreover, the intention of the parties is effectuated.
E. R. BERNSTEn
JUDGMENT--MERGER-FoREcLOSURE
OF LIEN OF JUDGMENT ON NoTE.-The

or MORTGAGE AS DESTROYING PRIoTrY

Illinois Appellate Court, in McDonald
v. Culhane,1 held that a creditor, who had recovered a judgment at law
on a note and then later, in a foreclosure action on a separate real estate
mortgage given as collateral security for such a note, obtained a deficiency
judgment, had, through merger of the first judgment with the second, lost
the priority of the lien of his first judgment, thus permitting an intervening judgment of a third person to become a prior lien. The facts disclosed
that Culhane, as receiver for the Rockford National Bank, held a note for
$10,000 collaterally secured by certain other notes which in turn were
secured by a mortgage all executed by John F. Walsh. On December 7,
1934, Culhane recovered a judgment by confession on the principal note
upon which execution was issued several days later and duly returned un6 In addition to those cases cited above, the court examined and commented on
Abel v. Schuett, 329 IIl. 323, 160 N.E. 548 (1928); Board of Missions of Methodist
Episcopal Church, South v. Mayo, 81 F. (2d) 449 (1936); McDonald v. Jarvis, 64
W. Va. 55, 60 S.E. 990 (1908); Haines v. Weirick, 155 Ind. 548, 58 N.E. 712 (1900);
Durham v. Hovey, 195 Mich. 243, 161 N.W. 883 (1917); Hall v. Meade, 244 Ky. 718,
51 S.W. (2d) 974 (1932); Boyer v. Murphy, 202 Cal. 23, 259 P. 38 (1927).
7 This is the language of the court in the principal case at page 308.
8 White v. City of Marion, 139 Iowa 479, 117 N.W. 254 (1908).
1 303 Il. App. 101, 24 N.E. (2d) 737 (1940).
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satisfied. On August 16, 1935, the mortgage notes held as collateral security
2
were in default and the receiver foreclosed the mortgage. In that prothe
plaintiff the
to
be
due
found
amount
in
the
court
included
ceeding, the
sum of $13,351.18, being the amount of the earlier judgment. A sale was
had and the mortgaged premises were sold, the price being $10,721.49
short of the debt, interest and costs. On January 28, 1936, a deficiency
judgment was rendered in favor of Culhane against Walsh, upon which
execution was also issued and subsequently returned unsatisfied. Thereafter, from time to time, Walsh paid various sums of money which, the
court found, Culhane applied toward the satisfaction of the deficiency
judgment so that at the time of this partition suit there still remained
due from Walsh the sum of $3,801.09.
Upon these facts the court held that the judgment of December 7, 1934,
merged in the deficiency judgment of January 28, 1936, and therefore an
interim judgment obtained September 5, 1935, by one Helen Krumnga,
against the same defendant, had become a better lien, entitled to priority
in the proceeds obtained from the sale of Walsh's interest in the parcel
of land involved in the present partition suit. The writer of the opinion
particularly stressed as reason for the decision the fact that appellant's
course of conduct resulted in a merger of judgments or at least was sufficient to estop him from denying that a merger had taken place.
At common law, the theory of merger was never extended to judg3
ments for the reason that judgments were all of equal dignity. In this
country the overwhelming weight of authority subscribes to the common
law theory, 4 but there does exist a small minority view that wherever an
existing judgment is used as the basis of a cause of action the judgment
represents the debt and consequently is merged in the new judgment in
like manner as would any other debt.5 The minority holding, however, is
2 It does not clearly appear whether the receiver held a sale of the collateral
and purchased the same or merely assumed the right to exercise control over
the same as an additional means of enforcing the original obligation. If the
former, it does not legally appear that the receiver was not entitled to enforce
both the original and the purchased obligations to secure full satisfaction of both.
Seder v. Gould, 274 Mass. 223, 174 N.E. 311 (1931); Lord v. Hartford, 175 Mass.
320, 56 N.E. 609 (1900); Wade v. Chicago, Springfield & St. Louis Railroad, 149
U.S. 327, 13 S. Ct. 892, 37 L.Ed. 755 (1893); Peacock v. Phillips, 247 Ill. 467, 93 N.E.
415 (1910). If the latter, then he should be allowed but one recovery comprising
the original obligation, since by his own conduct he has recognized he possessed
no other right. Chicago Artesian Well Co. v. Corey, 60 Ill. 73 (1871); Stokes v.
Frazier, 72 Ill. 428 (1874).
s Lilly-Brackett Co. v. Sonneman, 163 Cal. 632, 126 P. 483 (1912). Springs v.
Pharr, 131 N.C. 191, 42 S.E. 590 (1902).
4 Lawton v. Perry, 40 S. C. 255, 18 S.E. 861 (1893); 15 R.C.L. 791, § 246; Springs
v. Pharr, 131 N. C. 191, 42 S.E. 590 (1902).
5 There is probably no serious objection to the extension of the theory of merger
to include judgments where used as a cause of action and the llen upon which the
first judgment is founded is preserved. In the opinion of one writer such should
be the law. See Freeman, Judgments, II, 1230, § 580; Price v. First National
Bank of Atchison, 62 Kan. 735, 64 P. 637 (1901); Gould v. Hayden, 63 Ind. 443
(1878).
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subject to certain qualifications, such as the situation found in the instant
case, where a creditor has an enforceable right in personam coexisting
with a right in rem,6 or where a note is secured by a mortgage and the
creditor resorts first to his note and later to his lien. In such cases the
courts are almost uniform in holding that the lien of the first judgment
is not lost and does not merge. 7 In this respect the instant case is wholly
unsupported by precedent.
It would also appear that the instant decision is grounded on some
principle of estoppel. An estoppel is never raised against a party litigant
unless he has been guilty of conduct or omissions of conduct amounting
to fraud or at least misrepresentation. 8 In no event is a party litigant
estopped to present evidence where he has proceeded in the manner
sanctioned by law.9
Illinois has always recognized the right of a lien-creditor to enforce
his debt in either or both the courts of law or equity 0 with but one limitation, that is, he shall have but one recovery." The receiver in the instant
case, having pursued both his legal and equitable remedies, collected
payments from the debtor and applied them toward the satisfaction of
the junior-lien judgment arising from the foreclosure deficiency decree.
In so doing he was acting as he had a legal right to do since there was
no direction given at the time of payment and the creditor was entitled
to make such application as he saw fit. 12 By so doing he may, and perhaps
should be held to, have reduced the original obligation pro tanto, but it
is hard to see how his conduct in lawfully applying the proceeds should
estop him from asserting the validity of his original prior lien for the
balance still due. It does not appear that the receiver, in the instant case,
was in any way attempting to collect more than the amount lawfully due,
so the case may be distinguished from Todd v. Todd, 13 in which the Illinois
Appellate Court refused to allow the secured creditor's earlier legal judgment a priority in other property of the debtor where he had also enforced
his lien by foreclosure proceedings because he had failed to credit the
debtor with the sums recovered thereby. The court condemned the conduct of the secured creditor in seeking an unfair profit and held his action
worked an estoppel.
L. LEFmsa
6 Vanuxem v. Burr, 151 Mass. 386, 24 N.E. 773 (1890); Dies v. Wilson County
Bank, 129 Tenn. 89, 165 S.W. 248 (1914).
7 Palmer v. Harris, 100 Ill. 276 (1881); Merriman v. Barker, 121 Ind. 74, 22 N.E.
992 (1889). See Freeman, Judgments, II, 2092 § 1004.
8 Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 295, 13 L.Ed. 703 (1850).
9 Bush v. Stephens, 131 Ark. 137, 197 S.W. 1157 (1917); City of Chicago v. Partridge, 248 Ill. 442, 94 N.E. 115 (1911).
10 Karnes v. Lloyd, 52 Ill. 113 (1869).
"1Barchard v. Kohn, 157 Il. 579, 41 N.E. 902 (1895); Muncie National Bank v.
Brown, 112 Ind. 474, 14 N.E. 358 (1887).
12 Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Buckles, 89 Ill. 237 (1878); Wellman v. Miner,
179 Ill. 326, 53 N.E. 609 (1899).
13 214 Ill. App. 282 (1919).

